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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT RULES ON THE
NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
"MANAGEMENT AND DOMESTIC REMEDIES"
By Sergei V. Vinogradov*
I. INTRODUCTION
The final part of the draft rules adopted by the
International Law Commission, Part VI, which is under
consideration here, is entitled "Miscellaneous Provisions".
That speaks for itself. It comprises a set of articles some of
which were elaborated and adopted only recently while others
were transferred from different parts of the draft. The lack
of a generalizing idea devoids this part of inner logic and
structural integrity typical for the other parts of the text.
This remark, however, does not mean that these provisions are
unimportant and do not deserve attention and close
examination.
In general terms, provisions of Part VI can be divided
into three categories, concerning respectively: management of
international watercourses (arts. 26-28), exchange of data and
information (arts. 30 and 31) and domestic remedies (art. 32).
It is along this line that the further examination of the
draft rules will proceed.
II. MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES.
Among three articles which form this category, the
-2-.
most important is Article 26 entitled "Management". It reads: 	 (Th
1. "Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of
them, enter into consultations concerning the management of an
international watercourse, which may include the establishment
of a joint management mechanism.
t Dr. of Law, Senior Research Fellow, USSR Academy of Sciences
2. For the purposes of this article, "management" refers,
in particular, to:
(a) planning the sustainable development of an international
watercourse and providing for the implementation of any plans
adopted; and
(b) otherwise promoting rational and optimal utilization,
protection and control of the watercourse". 1)
Since the International Law Commission has acknowledged
in general the essentially "shared" character of international
watercourses and subsequently the interdependence of the
community of States sharing them, the introduction of this
provision in the draft rules seems to be fully justified.
Although very general in its scope and content, especially if
compared with an article proposed by the Special Rapporteur
Professor Stephen McCaffrey in his sixth report, 2) this
provision reflects the generally recognized need for
integrated management of an international watercourse for the
benefit of all riparian States. It is obvious that any attempt
at codification and progressive development in any particular
sphere of international law has to be based on certain
- 3 -
fundamental concepts. The essential underlying concepts in
this case include a general obligation of States to co-operate
(set forth in article 8 of the draft) and an objective of
optimal and rational utilization of water resources of
international watercourses (reflected in article 5).
From a conceptual point of view the adoption of this
provision reflects a visible shift from the doctrine of non-
harmful use of the State's territory (or limited territorial
sovereignty) to the concept of the community of watercourse
States. This concept was applied by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in its well-known River Oder decision,
which spoke in terms of "a community of interest of riparian
States". 3) It was endorsed subsequently in a number of
international agreement, resolutions and recommendations, as
well as in legal doctrine. 4)
This concept may well be regarded as derived from the
principle of co-operation, which forms the foundation of
integrated basin management. There is no need to dwell upon
the necessity and the role of the integrated approach to the
development of international watercourses. A great deal has
been written in this respect. 5) Suffice it to say that mutual
co-operation of watercourse States has in many cases led to a
more efficient use of water resource shared by them than
otherwise would be possible. An integrated approach, which can
be regarded as a logical result of the recognition of the
growing economic as well as ecological interdependencies
across national boundaries will improve "the consideration by
watercourse States of modalities of management that are
- 4 -
appropriate to the individual States and watercourses in
question". 6) From the legal point of view the utilization of
the integrated management approach my help to mitigate or
reconcile the somewhat inherent contradiction between two
fundamentals of the law of international watercourses: the
principle of equitable utilization and the rule of "no
appreciable harm". 7)
After having been introduced by the Special Rapporteur in
his sixth report, article 26 has undergone drastic changes.
The Commission's Drafting Committee managed to dispose of
practically all controversial provisions and wording of the
proposed article, while leaving intact its main idea: the need
for co-operation of riparian States in managing their shared
water resources. As was already mentioned, the article appears
to be extremely general, thus corresponding to the "residual"
nature of the draft rules.
Paragraph I provides nothing more than a not very
stringent obligation of States "to enter into consultations
concerning the management of an international watercourse" at
the request of any of them. This request is not conditioned,
however, by any objective element, which in the view of some
members of the Commission was not entirely satisfactory. On
the other hand, introduction of any such conditions could make
appropriate provision even less obligatory if not illusory.
The watercourse States are not obliged to "manage" the
particular watercourse or to establish a joint management
mechanism. It is quite obvious. In fact, it is rather
difficult to develop a sufficiently convincing argument that
- 5 -
there are any obligations of this sort in general
international law. Although nothing precludes the Commission
from defining and particularizing general principles,
including the duty to co-operate, still such obligations could
be regarded at present only in terms of lex ferenda, that goes
beyond the scope of the Commission's mandate.
The text of paragraph 1 is flexible enough to be
acceptable to States with different and even divergent
positions with respect to consultations and their possible
legal consequences. The objective of the Special Rapporteur
Professor McCaffrey had been to formulate this paragraph in
such a way as "to strike a fair balance between a simple
recommendation to enter into consultations and an obligation
to enter into "negotiations" as had been recommended by the
second Special Rapporteur in his third report". 8) It can go
without explanation that the obligation to enter into
consultations is not entirely the same as a duty to negotiate,
since consultations do not necessarily lead to negotiations.
The obligation to enter into consultations also does not
presuppose the obligation to achieve some particular result.
The outcome of the consultations may be different and is left
by the article in the hands of the States concerned. One of
the possible consequences of such consultations may be the
establishment of a joint management mechanism. The choice of
the term "mechanism" instead of a "joint organization for the
management", is quite understandable. The article must focus
not on the creation of a joint organization but rather on
joint management which could take different forms. Their range
- 6 -
is wide enough: from ad hoc or regular meetings of the
	 (Th
representatives of the watercourse States to joint projects
and programs, bilateral arrangements and, where deemed
necessary and appropriate, the establishment of permanent
institutional machinery.
Although the notion of "management" is the very essence
of article 26 there is no concise definition of this term as
might be expected. Instead of this, paragraph 2 of the article
points out in general terms "the most common features of a
program of management of an international watercourse". 9)
They include, inter alia, planning the development of a
watercourse so that it may be sustained for the benefit of
watercourse States and their population and implementation of
such plans jointly or individually.
	 /Th
One can ask: why did not the Commission try to produce a
comprehensive definition of the term "management" as was
requested by some of its members and governments'
representatives in the Sixth Committee? Was it a result of its
inability to do so, or just an unwillingness to be involved in
time-consuming and unproductive deliberations?
This approach of definition by reference, however
controversial it is, can be justified in view of the
difficulties connected with defining the term "management",
which is widely used in different meanings in literature and
legal instruments in relation to the exploitation and
development of natural resources. For example, several
/Th
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea•
Convention contain the notion of management with regard to
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living marine resources although without any attempt to
clarify its exact content. 10)
Professor Guillermo Cano, for example, defines natural
resources management, as "the action of man aiming at their
utilization or at his protection against their harmful
effects, including all successive steps from the exploration
and inventory thereof to their ultimate re-use or restoration
after use". 11) In his view natural resources management is a
process which must cover all steps and activities required for
policy implementation, including: inventory, exploration and
monitoring of existing resources; evaluation (economic
appraisal of natural resources); policy-making; planning (for
implementation of a prior policy decision); legal regulation
and control; development (the executive or operational stage);
recovery and restoration. 12) It is evident that according to
this approach, "management" is regarded mainly as an
administrative process, a view which is shared by other
authorities in this field. 13)
On the other hand, water management is deemed also in
more technical context, as a discipline which deals with
problems of occurrence, acquisition and use of water
resources. 14) The components of water management embrace:
development of water resources (including, in particular, the
construction of storage reservoirs, drilling of test holes for
accessible groundwater, etc.); supplying the population,
industry and agriculture; use of water power; navigability of
streams (including construction of shipping canals); regard
for the quality of water; flood protection; construction of
- 8 -
municipal sewers; care of recreation areas; etc. The complex
of water management includes also maintenance and operation of
structures and installations, planning , data collection and
related activities. All these elements form a complex whole
which must be kept in dynamic balance. 15) Thus, this approach
sees legal-institutional and administrative components as
important but not the only aspects of water management, which
of course do not exhaust its content.
in his sixth report Professor S.McCaffrey proposed an
article with a more or less complete list of functions which,
in his view, were covered by the term "management". Derived
from various international arrangements concerning the
establishment of international watercourse organizations and
commissions, they in practice could be regarded as powers and 	 (Th
functions entrusted to such joint institutions rather than as
the principal elements of "management" in the exact meaning of
this term.
Moreover, the Special Rapporteur has proposed also to
include in this article (as paragraph 3) a list of additional
functions which go beyond management, per se, such as:
fact-finding , submission of recommendations and reports, and
even serving as a forum for consultations, negotiations and
other procedures for peaceful settlement of watercourse
States' controversies.
In the course of extensive discussions in the Commission
and in the Sixth Committee it was, however, found more
appropriate to change the chapeau of the article as well as to
	 /Th
dispose of this list and to replace it with more general
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provisions set forth in subpara graphs (a) and (b). Together,
as the Commission's commentary puts it, "they would include
such functions as: planning of sustainable, multi-purpose
integrated development of international watercourses;
facilitation of regular communication and exchange of data or
information between watercourse States; and monitorin g of
international watercourses on a continuous basis." 16) This
enumeration, of course, is not exhaustive. Moreover, the
wording of the sub-paragraph (b) ("... otherwise promoting
rational and optimal utilization, protection and control of
the watercourse") permits the inclusion of practically all
possible components of water management, no matter what
interpretation of this term is applied.
On the other hand, the Professor McCaffrey's work in
outlining the main functions that may be entrusted to joint
institutions, was not at all futile. It should simply be left
to the parties to any future watercourse agreement to define
those functions, from his list, which should obtain in the
agreement between them.
Regulation of international watercourses, or "river
training" as it was called earlier, is generally considered as
one of the most important aspects of water management. Judge
Schwebel made the following observation concerning the role of
regulation: "Regulation, not itself a use of the waters, seeks
to tame the watercourses rampages, seasonal or otherwise; to
store waters for later use, such as irrigation; to maintain
the flow necessary for "firm" hydro-power generation; to
provide scouring and minimum flows for dilution of pollutants;
- 10 -
to sustain navi gation, timber floating and fisheries; and to 	 C-)
protect hydraulic works and other facilities and structures
such as docks and bridges". 17) Thus, regulation is a
necessary and sometimes indispensable prerequisite and
component of effective management of international
watercourses.
Control of the flow of an international watercourse by
means of regulation permits riparian States to use it in most
advantageous way, satisfying their needs and purposes. It
allows them not only to extract maximum benefit but also to
eliminate or mitigate hazards connected with utilization of
their shared water resources. On the other hand, regulation
undertaken within the boundaries of one riparian State
irrespective of its exterritorial effects and possible 	 /Th
consequences for the others can result in serious
controversies and conflicts between watercourse States. As
Professor McCaffrey quite correctly points out, "the fact that
river regulation is at once necessary for optimum utilization
and potentially harmful makes cooperation between watercourse
States essential." 18)
It is on this premise that the former Special Rapporteur
S.Schwebel raised this issue as a special subtopic in hi third
report, and proposed an article concerning regulation for
inclusion in the draft rules. 19) A few years later professor
McCaffrey as his successor also addressed this question
following in his deliberations the same lines that were set
forth by Judge Schwebel. 20)
Regulation of international watercourses is dealt with in
article 27 of the ILC's draft rules which reads:
"1. Watercourse States shall cooperate where appropriate
to respond to needs or opportunities for regulation of the
flow of the waters of an international watercourse.
2. Unless they have otherwise agreed, watercourse States
shall participate on an equitable basis in the construction
and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of such regulation
works as they may have agreed to undertake.
3. For the purposes of this article, "regulation" means
the use of hydraulic works or any other continuing measure to
alter, vary or otherwise control the flow of the waters of an
international watercourse".
The thrust of this article is quite clear. Closely
related to the provisions of article 26 on management it
specifies further the general obligation of cooperation
provided for in article 8. In fact, articles 26 and 27 relate
to the same subject, i.e. the joint utilization of an
international watercourse by riparian States. In this
connection it may appear rather unreasonable to treat
management and regulation separately. But, on the other hand,
in view of the significance commonly attached to regulation by
watercourse States there are no serious arguments against
dealing with this issue in a special article.
The content and the wording of article 27 is an outcome
of extensive analysis of appropriate international State
practice undertaken by Judge Schwebel and Professor McCaffrey.
A number of international arrangements concerning regulation
of international watercourses is impressive. 21) But of
- 12 -
particular importance in this respect are nine articles on the 	 (Th
Regulation of the Flow of Water of International Watercourses
adopted by the International Law Association at its fifty-
ninth Conference, in 1980, 22) which may be considered as a
restatement of the international law in effect. As such, ILA
articles contain certain general provisions some of which were
reflected in article 27. The discussion of this topic in the
Sixth Committee has revealed once more to what extent the
positions of States with respect to legal norms in general and
to regulation provision in particular were conditioned by
their geographic positions. Thus, on the one hand, attention
was drawn to the negative impact that regulation of a
watercourse could have on the territory of States situated
downstream. It was argued, that in many cases the construction
of regulation works upstream has been a source of conflict
between States. Consequently, a proposed article would have to
reconcile the traditional concept of the use of international
watercourses, based on the assumption that the principle of
State Sovereignty should prevail, with the current evolution
in the rights and obligations of States in exercising their
territorial competence. 23)
On the other hand, a view was expressed that the draft
had to protect not only the interests of downstream States by
attributing liability solely to upstream States, but also had
to take into account the water and energy requirements of
watercourse States as a whole. 24)
Article 27 appears to be acceptable to both sides. It is
based on the assumption that the best means to regulate
- 13 -
watercourses is through co-operation of riparian States while
not imposing any far-reaching obligations upon them. According
to this, as the ILC's commentary puts it, the article sets
forth the basic obligation in respect of regulation (paragraph
1), the duty of equitable participation as it applies to
regulation (paragraph 2), and a definition of the term
"regulation" (paragraph 3).
Whereas provisions contained in the first and the third
paragraphs do not pose any particular difficulties with
respect to their interpretation and application, it is not the
same with paragraph 2.
Thus, paragraph 1 obliges States to cooperate, where
appropriate, in response to those needs and opportunities for
regulation that really exist. This provision, if we compare it
with an article proposed by Professor McCaffrey, which
envisaged cooperation only "in identifying needs and
opportunities," significantly changes the scope of States'
obligation with regard to regulation. But, at the same time,
the obligation itself is formulated in more mandatory terms
than in the proposed article.
Paragraph 3, which defines the term "regulation" was
inspired by and is analogous to definitions elaborated by the
ILA in its draft rules and proposed by Judge Schwebel in his
third report. It was added at the request of some members of
the Commission and seems quite clear and unambigous.
The same cannot be said about the second para graph, which
is a residual rule and represents a specific application of
the general obligation of equitable participation contained in
- 14 -
article 5. According to the Commission's commentary, "it does
not require watercourse States to "participate", in any way,
in regulation works from which they derive no benefit. It
would simply mean that when one watercourse State a grees with
another to undertake regulation works, and receives benefits
therefrom, the former would be obliged, in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, to contribute to the construction
and maintenance of the works in proportion to the benefits it
received therefrom" 25) (emphasis added).
Certain questions arise in connection with paragraph 2
and the Commission's commentary. First of all, there is no
doubt that according to general international law nobody can
oblige States to participate in regulation works from which
they derive no benefit. A less obvious situation, which the
Commission failed to address in its commentary, can occur in
the case of a watercourse State deriving definite and
sometimes significant advantages from regulation undertaken by
another riparian State. While discussing an article proposed
by Professor McCaffrey some members of the Commission
expressed the view that its wording could be construed to mean
that, even in the absence of an agreement, watercourse States
would be expected to pay towards a project simply because they
happened to derive benefits from it. Although the Commission
left the wording of paragraph 2 almost unchanged and thus did
not remove completely the premises for such conclusions, it is
evident that neither the Special Rapporteur nor the ILC
envisaged such an interpretation of this provision. In such a
case as well, the State which receives benefits is not under
- 15 -
obligation to share the costs of regulation works that have
been undertaken by another riparian State.
If after a riparian State has been informed of another
State's plans concerning regulation and agrees to them,
perhaps even acknowledging them as beneficial to itself, does
this oblige them to participate in cost-bearing? The answer
must be in the negative inasmuch as consent or absence of
opposition to proposed measures does not constitute an
agreement to undertake regulation works as it is provided for
in paragraph 2.
Thus, the prior agreement seems to be conditio sine qua
non, that is the indispensable condition in any case where
regulation works undertaken by one riparian State may involve
the question of payment on the part of another watercourse
State. In this respect the very necessity of this paragraph
was questioned by some commentators. In their view it was
inconceivable that a watercourse agreement on regulation would
neglect the provision for the sharing of the burdens. On this
premise it was argued that the residual rule contained in this
paragraph was superfluous.
This position is not devoid of logic. The Commission in
its commentary stipulates that the provision of paragraph 2 is
a specific application of the general obligation of equitable
participation. Actually, this provision was derived from the
ILA rules on regulation of international watercourses and in
slightly modified form is analogous to article 4 of these
rules. 26) The question arises however why Special Rapporteurs
and the ILC have chosen this particular article and not some
- 16 -
other no less important provision of the ILA rules, which 	 CM
could also be regarded as such a special application of
general obligations. For example, the obligation not to cause
appreciable harm was developed in article 6, which obliges
States not to undertake regulation that would cause other
basin States substantial injury unless those States were
assured of enjoyment of the beneficial uses to which they were
entitled under the principle of equitable utilization.
In fact, no sufficiently convincing argument has been put
forward in favour of this particular provision which was
included in paragraph 2 of article 27. In view of the fact
that there still exist some doubts with regard to the
principle of equitable participation as a general rule of the
law of international watercourses 27) this provision could be
replaced by the more general obligation for the water course
States to reach an agreement on the construction and
maintenance of works relating to the watercourse.
Articles 28 and 29 of the draft, which deal with the
protection and safety of hydraulic installations, fall
completely within the context of management and regulation of
international watercourses. 28) At a first glance they may
appear too specific to be included in a text of such a general
character. On the other hand, the Commission is free to
formulate some more concrete obligations on issues of common
interest and particular significance for watercourse States.
Although hydraulic works or installations are erected as
a rule within the territory of one riparian State, under its
jurisdiction and control, this does not mean that other
- 17 -
watercourse States might not be concerned with their safety
and normal operation. It is clear in view of the fact that
such installation are usually considered to contain "dangerous
forces" which if released may inflict substantial damages to
other riparian States and their population. Furthermore, as
Judge Schwebel puts it in his third report, "system States
have a legitimate interest in the safety and security of
water-related installations, and not simply because of their
potential for death and destruction. More and more projects
are part of a regional or system-wide plan for development,
control and environmental protection, with benefits and costs,
direct and indirect, to each participating system State." 29)
This issue was addressed by all Special Rapporteurs,
although their approaches to it were not the same.
Traditionally the emphasis in States' practice and
international legal doctrine was on the problem of security of
hydraulic installations in time of armed conflict. It was
reflected, in particular, in the third report of Judge
Schwebel. 30) There are several provisions of general
international law (for example, Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Convention of 1949) which deal with the protection of
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, including water installations and irrigation
works, in time of armed conflict.
On the other hand, other issues of concern, such as acts
of sabotage by terrorists, as well as negligence or forces of
nature, which may threaten to an equal extent the safety of
water installations, have not been given much attention at the
- 18 -
international level. "Lacking generally is authoritative
articulation of general principles of co-operation in the
fields of public safety and security of water installations,
as is expression of the extent of a system State's possible
responsibility for failure to use its best efforts to keep
this kind of harm from happening". 31)
Although this does not mean that States have never
addressed this problem in their treaty practice, 32) the
absence of any generally recognized obligations with respect
to the safety of hydraulic installations in peacetime is
apparent. The need to fill this gap in legal regulation may
explain the shift towards this issue made by Judge Evensen and
followed by professor McCaffrey.
Article 28, which has undergone considerable changes in
the course of its discussion within the ILC, 33) is a step,
however modest, in the right direction. It lays down two
obligations of a substantive and procedural character,
embodied accordingly in the first and the second paragraphs.
Paragraph 1 obliges watercourse States, within their
respective territories, to employ their best efforts to
maintain and protect installations, facilities and other works
related to an international watercourse. This requirement
stems from the well established notion of due diligence
according to which States are under the obligation to take all
necessary measures to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction do not cause appreciable harm to other States. In
a given case, according to the commission's commentary,
"watercourse States may fulfil this obligation by doin g what
- 19 -
is within their individual capabilities" to maintain and
protect water installations and works as well as by taking all
reasonable precautions to protect such works from foreseeable
kinds of damage due to forces of nature, such as floods, or to
human acts, whether wilful or negligent". 34)
The second paragraph is procedural, providing for
consultations of watercourse States with regard to the safe
operation or maintenance of installations, facilities or other
works as well as their protection from wilful or negligent
acts or the forces of nature. The consultations are initiated
by the request of watercourse State "which has serious reason
to believe that it may suffer appreciable adverse effects" as
a result of improper operation, maintenance or inadequate
protection of the installations or other works.
Hence, this paragraph sets forth two objective standards
which may serve as a safeguard against possible attempts on
the part of one watercourse State to abuse its position by
using the proposed consultations as an excuse to intervene in
the activities within the jurisdiction of another watercourse
State. Firstly, it is the requirement that the watercourse
State most have a "serious reason to believe" that it may
suffer adverse effects, i.e. that the danger has to be real,
although not imminent. Secondly, the obligation to enter into
consultations is triggered only when there is a threat of
appreciable adverse effects". But, according to the ILC's
commentary, the threshold established by this standard is
lower than that of "appreciable harm" 35) which makes it
easier for a concerned watercourse State to initiate
- 20 -
consultations.
Thus, article 28 can be regarded as a successful attempt
to strike a balance between obligation not to interfere in the
internal affairs of States, based on the principle of State




The use of local courts and administrative bodies in
resolving transboundary pollution problems is gradually
becoming an important element of international legal
regulation in the field of environmental protection and in
gaining substantial support in the States' practice and legal
doctrine.
This private-remedies system has certain advantages in
comparison with inter-State solution of transboundary
environmental problems. As Finnish representative in the Sixth
Committee observed, "several reasons spoke for domestic
procedures at private level: they were usually less costly;
they involved individuals and companies actually engaged in
the relevant activities; they provided a more effective
incentive to comply with the rules; in certain cases they were
faster than diplomatic channels; they led to legally biding
and enforceable determinations of the relevant parties's
obligations; and they encouraged regional cooperation in the
management of the particular watercourse system." 36)
Hence, it is not surprising that this issue was addressed
by Professor McCaffrey in his sixth report, although it has
not been mentioned in the outline on the basis of which the
Commission was working. In a view of the Special Rapporteur,
there was certain merit in having actual and potential
watercourse problems resolved, in so far as possible, through
civil law procedure which usually brought relief to those
suffering environmental harm more expeditiously than
diplomatic procedures and could prevent problems from
- 22 -
escalating and becoming unnecessarily politicized. 37)
So, among the eight additional articles proposed by the
Special Rapporteur in his sixth report, three (articles 2, 3
and 4) had direct relation to the question of private
remedies. 38) The extensive discussions within the ILC and the
reduction work undertaken by its Drafting Committee has
resulted in 1991 in the adoption of article 32
("Nondiscrimination"). In fact this article is composed of
what was left from these three articles after their careful
and somewhat critical discussion in the Commission.
Article 32 stipulates that watercourse states are under
the obligation not to discriminate on the basis of nationality
or residence in granting access to judicial and other
procedures, in accordance with their legal systems, to any
natural or juridical person who has suffered appreciable harm
as a result of an activity related to an international
watercourse or is exposed to a threat thereof.
According to the ILC's commentary, "the gravamen of this
article is that where the watercourse States provides access
to judicial or other procedures to their citizens or
residents, they must provide access on an equal basis to
non-citizens and non-residents." 39) The article is not
confined exclusively to cases involving transboundary adverse
effects, but covers as well situations such as that "of a
foreign national who had suffered harm in the territory of the
watercourse State in which the source of the harm was
situated." 40)
The wording of the article, and in particular its phrase
- 23 -
"has suffered appreciable harm... or is exposed to a threat
thereof", reveals another important aspects of this provision.
As the commentary puts it, the article is applicable "both to
cases involving actual harm and to those in which the harm is
prospective in nature." 41) According, the commentary adds,
"since cases of the latter kind can often be dealt with most
effectively through administrative proceedings, the article,
in referring to "judicial and other procedures", requires that
access be afforded on a non-discriminatory basis both to
courts and to any applicable administrative procedures." 42)
The rule, contained in article 32, and is known as a
principle of equal access, and is not a new one in inter-State
practice. It was included in some international agreements,
for example, the 1974 Nordic Convention on the Protection of
the Environment, 43) and a number of recommendations of
international organizations. Of particular importance in this
respect are the recommendations of the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which laid down
certain basic principles of private-remedies system, 44)
including mentioned above. The analogous provision is enclosed
in the UNEP Principles of conduct in the field of the
conversation and harmonious utilization of shared natural
resources (Principle 14) as well as in the legal principles of
environmental protection and sustainable development drafted
recently by the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
(Article 20) 46).
Some points are pertinent to the provision of article 32.
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Firstly, there can be noticed certain discrepancy between the
title of the article "Non-discrimination") and its subject and
content. Traditionally the principle of non-discrimination has
been understood mainly in terms of equal regard to actual as
possible adverse effects in the country of origin of the
pollution and in the countries exposed to it. 47) The comments
accompanying article 13 ("Non-discrimination between domestic
and transboundary environmental interferences")* proposed by
the WCED's Experts Group explains that "according to this
principle States are obliged vis-a-vis other States, when
considering under their domestic policy or law the
permissibility of environmental interferences or a significant
risk thereof, to treat environmental interferences of which
the detrimental effects are or may be mainly felt outside the
area of their national jurisdiction in the same way as, or at
least not less favourably than, those interference of which
the detrimental effects would be felt entirely inside the area
under their national jurisdiction." 48) The same conclusion
can be drawn from the analysis of the relevant provisions of
other legal instruments. Thus, as Robert Stein once observed,
"the principle of nondiscrimination is an application of an
adaptation of the "Golden Rule" Do not do unto others what you
do not want to be done unto yourself." 49)
On the other hand, the principle of non-discrimination,
at least as it is formulated in some legal documents,
embraces, inter alia, a rule of equal right of access. For
example, in accordance with the OECD's Recommendation C(74)
224 "countries should initially base their action on the
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principle of non-discrimination," which, among other things,
provides that "persons affected by transfrontier pollution
should be granted no less favourable treatment than persons
affected by a similar pollution in the country from which such
transfrontier pollution originates." 50)
The same approach may be found in the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 51) which speaks
in terms of non-discrimination against foreign nationals.
And still, the principle of non-discrimination is
considered mostly as a broad principle of inter-State
relations, which may include but is not limited to the rule of
equal access. Although this inconsistency of article 32 is not
significant and has mainly technical meaning it can,
nevertheless, lead to certain confusion and misunderstanding.
Secondly, the rule of equal access can pose serious
problems for States as regards its practical implementation.
As WCED's Experts Group on Environmental Law pointed out
"while there are good reasons why in certain cases resort to
domestic proceedings in the State of origin is to be preferred
over the intergovernmental approach, such proceedings will not
always be possible." 52)
One representative in the Sixth Committee while
acknowledging that individuals who might potentially be
affected would understandably wish to be involved in the
preparation in other States of decisions designed to avoid
hazards, stressed at the same time that a legal claim to be
involved similar to that granted by the national law of other
States to their own national organizations would place a great
- 26 -
strain on such procedures. 53) 	 /Th
Furthermore, the adoption of this rule may require
significant changes in the legislation of various countries
which is not always welcomed and is connected with many
difficulties.
The States' practices vary significantly with regard to
the rule of equal access. In some countries, such as France or
the Netherlands, (potentially) affected foreign persons will
have locus standi, or access to and treatment in
administrative or judiciary proceedings. In the others, on the
opposite, "the administrative authorities and/or courts take
the view that the scope of the applicable administrative law
is strictly territorial, so that foreign interests are not
considered to be legally affected not protected by that law
with the consequence that the foreign complainants are denied
locus standi." 54)
At present only some States have accepted this rule
either by introducing it into their national legislation or by
becoming a party to the international agreement. Practise
shows that this rule is appropriate mainly for a small group
of integrated States and can be most effectively applied by
the States with homogeneous or similar social, political and
legal systems and traditions, as in the case with Scandinavian
or OECD countries. Hence, as it was pointed out in the Sixth
Committee, this provision was virgin territory for many States
and the national legislation and different legal traditions of
p'\
member States suggested that it might be possible to reach
agreement only on the lowest common denominator, especially as
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regards the status of private individuals. 55) The question
which arises in this respect and needs to be examined
thoroughly is whether the provision of article 32 corresponds
to this requirement.
It is on this premise that the last and more general
comment must be made. At present there is no universal legal
instrument in effect that would establish the rule of equal
access as a generally recognized principle, nor has it been
accepted by majority of States in their national legislation.
Rather, it was endorsed in a number of recommendations and
other legal documents of "soft law" character. It does not
mean, of course, that this non-obligatory norm may not
ultimately acquire binding force through the process of
customary law formation. But the lack of opinion juris as a
necessary element for creating customary rules does not permit
the unequivocal conclusion that the rule of equal access has
emerged as a norm of general international law. Even the
ardent protagonists of this rule acknowledge that "a right of
the individual neighbour residing on the other side of the
frontier to equal access to administrative and judicial
procedure cannot be seen as part of international law in the
field of the protection of the environment". 56)
Given these circumstances, it is rather questionable
whether this rule will be acceptable to the States as a
"residual" norm designed for general application.
III. EXCHANGE OF DATA AND INFORMATION
Two articles contained in Part VI fall into this category
- article 30 "Indirect procedures" and article 31 "Data and
information vital to national defence and security". Both,
articles are complementary to the procedural provisions of the
ILC's draft and deal with exceptional cases related to the
exchange of data and information.
Article 30 focuses upon the situation where there are
serious obstacles to direct contacts between watercourse
States. In such a case, the States concerned are required to
fulfil their obligations of cooperation, including exchange of
data and information, notification, communications and
negotiations, through any indirect procedures accepted by
them.
The idea of this provision is clear enough to require
extensive deliberations. This article deals with the
circumstances where there are no direct contacts between
riparian countries, such as an absence of diplomatic relations
or an armed conflict. There are such instances, as, for
example, pollution incidents, floods, and other water related
hazards, when even in the absence of sustained relations
between watercourse States some form of contacts is
indispensable. According to the Me's commentary, 'there will
often be channels which the States concerned utilize for the
purpose of conveying communications to each other". 57) The
range of such channels embraces good offices of third
countries or international organizations, including joint
water management institutions, armistice commissions, etc.
Article 31 is an exception to procedural rules governing
the exchange of information between watercourse States. It
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excuses a watercourse State providing data or information
vital to its national defence or security. At the same time,
that State is obliged to co-operate in good faith with the
other watercourse States with a view to providing as much
information as possible under the circumstances.
Originally this provision was submitted by Professor
McCaffrey in his fourth report as a part of a more general
article on "regular exchange of data and information." 58)
Subsequently it appeared as a separate article and later on
was transferred to Part VI.
The general thrust of this article is evident and fully
justified. Following, in principle, the same pattern as was
proposed by Judge Schwebel in his third report 59), the !LC
addressed a very sensitive issue which has always been a
matter of concern of sovereign States: confidentiality of
"classified" information. The adoption of this article can be
regarded as an attempt to strike a balance between the
legitimate interests of all the States concerned. As Judge
Schwebel puts it, "the very real needs in the information and
data field when dealing with shared water resources must here
be balanced against this undeniable interest of the system
State to retain confidentiality in sensitive circumstances".
60)
Thus, in the view of the Commission, while States cannot
realistically be expected to disclose information of
particular importance for them, at the same time, other
watercourse States should not be devoid of information
concerning measures that may affect them. So, the bulk of
- 30 -
article 31 is directed towards promotion of co-operation
between the watercourse States even in cases where there exist
certain restrictions based on domestic legislation.
The commentary of the Commission explains that "the
obligation to provide "as much information as possible" could
be fulfilled in many cases by furnishing a general description
of the manner in which the measures would alter the condition
of the water of affect other States". It adds also that the
"circumstances" referred to in the article "are those that led
to the withholding of the data or information". 61)
The guiding principle of this article is good-faith
cooperation. Although the notion of "good faith" lacks the
necessary precision, the emphasis on this principle can be
explained by the fact that the concept of a State secret was
open to abuse. So, as it was pointed out by one of ILC's
members, "the reference to "good faith" was thresfore meant to
serve as a safeguard". 62) It is worth mentioning in this
respect that the OECD's report on transfrontier pollution
regards good faith as the key principle in the matter of
information and consultation. "On this account it need not be
stressed that a country would depart from this principle, one
underlying all neighbourly relations, were it to fall back on
a too extensive "State-secret" concept, thus making entirely
void information and consultation of its substance". 63)
Hence, the inclusion of the "good faith" principle within
the context of article 31, no matter how ambiguous this notion
/Th
can be regarded, is fully justified and commendable.	 _y
Another aspect of article 31 which is less evident and
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needs to be clarified concerns the nature of restricted
information. Under this article the information which should
not be divulged to other watercourse States is defined as
"vital to the national defence and security", i.e. mainly
strategic or military types of information. Due to this, other
types of data and information which do not correspond to this
qualification but, nevertheless, can be considered as
"classified" are left beyond the scope of the exception
provided for in article 31.
This approach differs considerably from that of Judge
Schwebel who has acknowledged that "the matter of "trade
secrets," national or corporate, has also come up in this
context, as has a reluctance to divulge certain aspects of
economic planning or local socio-economic conditions". 64) On
this premise he proposed to divide the duty into two
categories. "If the matter be vital from the standpoint of
national defence, the system State is excused on the condition
that it furnish as much of the requested information or
data... as will be sufficient to appraise the other system
State of the basic situation... If, on the other hand, the
information or data be of a lesser, "restricted", character,
whether economic, military or social, the duty to furnish is
not excused where the other system State can show that it is
prepared to protect the restricted status and its laws,
regulations and practices give assurances that the information
or data will in fact be so protected". 65)
This "double standard" approach, although rather
complicated, was flexible enough in order to respond
- 32 -
adequately to various problems which may arise in connection
with classified information.
This approach was not endorsed, however, either by the
present Special Rapporteur, or by the Commission. In fact,
Professor McCaffrey has acknowledged that "consideration
should also be given to the related matter of information that
does not, strictly speaking, relate to national security, but
may be classified as a "trade secret" or relate to such
possibly sensitive matters as economic planning or socio-
economic conditions". 66) But this did not lead to any changes
in the original draft proposed by Professor McCaffrey.
The Commission in its commentary did not provide any
argument in favour of its preference. In this connection, it
may be asked whether the adoption of this particular
	 (Th
formulation mean that all other information, even classified
under national laws, which is not qualified as "vital" is to
be disclosed at the request of any other watercourse State.
Would not it be more appropriate to elaborate less far-
reaching provision 67) - leaving it to the States concerned to
work out more stringent obligation?
These questions have to be 'considered carefully before
this provision becomes ultimately an integral part of the
future framework legal document.
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